Decision
Mr X & Coillte
From Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI)
Case number: OCE-154142-L3Q9G1
Published on
From Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI)
Case number: OCE-154142-L3Q9G1
Published on
Whether Coillte was justified in refusing access to environmental information relating to fireline construction and maintenance coming within the scope of the appellant’s request on the basis that the request was manifestly unreasonable under article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations.
25 March 2026
1. This case relates to a previous appeal to this Office, reference OCE-130555-Z5P6H0 .
2. On 15 August 2022, the appellant submitted a request to Coillte for:
• “Information on all fireline construction and maintenance carried out by Coillte from 1-1-2021 to date
• All environmental risk assessment information for Item 1
• Information on consultation with relevant authorities and copies of any consents sought and received”
3. On 31 August 2022, Coillte wrote to the appellant, inviting him to make a more specific request. In doing so, Coillte referenced both article 7(8) and article 9(2)(b) of the Regulations, noting its position that the appellant’s request remained formulated in too general a manner. Coillte suggested that the appellant confine his request “to a subset of forest numbers within any county of your choice”.
4. In response, the appellant contended that his request was not made in too general a manner. He noted his view that he considered his request “to be reasonable in that it provides a temporal framework for very specific and clearly defined subject matter”. In addition, he noted that he was “satisfied that [his] request is adequately formulated so as to not require refinement”.
5. On 14 September 2022, Coillte issued its original decision wherein it stated that having “considered the volume of records which are relevant to your request, it is my opinion that your request remains manifestly unreasonable. Following receipt and examination of your request, I have decided to refuse it under article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations”.
6. On 15 September 2022 the appellant submitted a request for an internal review of Coillte’s decision.
7. In its internal review decision, issued on 14 October 2022, Coillte affirmed its position and stated that “complying with the request would overwhelm the AIE Team if it were to act on the request alone”. The Commissioner was not satisfied that sufficient detail had been provided to justify its refusal under article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations. The Commissioner’s decision was to annul the decision of Coillte and direct it to carry out a new internal review.
8. On 29 November 2024, Coillte issued its new internal review decision, affirming its original decision.
9. On 02 December 2024, this Office received an appeal submitted by the appellant on Coillte's decision dated 29 November 2024, appeal reference OCE-154142-L3Q9G1.
10. I have carried out a review under article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations. In so doing, I have had regard to the correspondence between Coillte and the appellant, as outlined above, and to correspondence between this Office and both Coillte and the appellant. In addition, I have had regard to:
• the Guidance document provided by the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government on the implementation of the AIE Regulations (the Minister's Guidance);
• Directive 2003/4/EC (the AIE Directive), upon which the AIE Regulations are based;
• the 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention); and
• The Aarhus Convention—An Implementation Guide (Second edition, June 2014) (the Aarhus Guide)
11. What follows does not comment or make findings on each and every argument advanced but all relevant points have been considered.
12. In accordance with article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, the role of this Office is to review the public authority's internal review decision and to affirm, annul or vary it. Where appropriate, in the circumstances of an appeal, the Commissioner will require the public authority to make available environmental information to the appellant.
13. As noted, this case relates to a previous appeal to this Office, reference OCE-130555-Z5P6H0 , decision dated 29 August 2024. Coillte issued its new internal review decision on 29 November 2024.
14. The scope of this appeal concerns whether Coillte was justified in refusing access to environmental information relating to fireline construction and maintenance coming within the scope of the appellant's request on the basis that the request was manifestly unreasonable under article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations.
Article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations
15. Article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations provides that a public authority may refuse to make environmental information available where the request is manifestly unreasonable having regard to the volume or range of information sought. This provision seeks to transpose Article 4(1)(b) of the AIE Directive, which provides that Member States may provide for a request for environmental information to be refused if the request is manifestly unreasonable, and, in turn, is based on part of Article 4(3)(b) of the Aarhus Convention.
16. Article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations must be read alongside article 10 of the AIE Regulations. Article 10(3) of the AIE Regulations requires a public authority to consider each request on an individual basis and weigh the public interest served by disclosure against the interest served by refusal. Article 10(4) of the AIE Regulations provides that the grounds for refusal of a request shall be interpreted on a restrictive basis having regard to the public interest served by disclosure.
Reformulation/Refinement
17. The Minister's Guidance, at paragraph 12.8, states that article 9(2) of the AIE Regulations "clarifies that a public authority may refuse to make information available if the request is considered unreasonable due to the range of material sought, if the request is too general or if the material requested is not yet completed. Public authorities are requested to invoke these grounds for refusal sparingly, and to assist the applicant (to reformulate a request, for example) as appropriate". In light of this, I am of the view that where a public authority intends to refuse a request under article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations, it should first assist the appellant to reformulate the request as appropriate. Both public authorities and appellants should seek to liaise constructively with a view to processing the request as efficiently as possible. It is important to note that constructive engagement is not, in and of itself, a requirement for a public body's reliance on or an immediate basis for refusal under article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations.
18. There was correspondence between the parties in respect of reformulation/refinement of the request. The decision maker in Coillte set out their view that the appellant's request was formulated in too general a manner in accordance with article 9(2)(b) of the Regulations. Coillte noted that the appellant's request covers all of Ireland over a 19 month period and, in accordance with article 7(8) of the AIE Regulations, invited him to make a more specific request. On that basis, Coillte suggested that the appellant confined his request to "a subset of forest numbers within any county of [his] choice".
19. On 31 August 2022, the appellant responded to the refinement invitation, setting out his view that he was satisfied his request was "adequately formulated so as to not require refinement".
20. In the course of informal discussion with this Office, the appellant agreed to reduce the timeframe of the request to a 12 month period but not to reduce the geographic scope.
21. Having examined Coillte's correspondence to the appellant and the detail provided therein, it is clear that Coillte offered help to the appellant to refine the request and provided examples of how this might be done (e.g by refining the request to a particular geographical area, or confining his request to a subset of forest numbers in a county). However, as the reformulation of a request requires collaboration on the part of an appellant, I am of the view that greater willingness on the part of the appellant in this case to reformulate his request such as to reduce the potential number of records in scope would likely have allowed the appellant to receive some of the information originally sought.
Meeting the Manifestly Unreasonable Threshold
22. The European Commission's First Proposal for the AIE Directive envisaged that the exception in Article 4(1)(b) would cover requests "variously described in national legal systems as vexatious or amounting to an abus de droit." It noted that "compliance with certain requests could involve the public authority in disproportionate cost or effort or would obstruct or significantly interfere with the normal course of its activities. Public authorities should be able to refuse access in such cases in order to ensure their proper functioning." The Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) has emphasised that "whether or not a request is manifestly unreasonable relates to the nature of the request itself, for example, its volume, vagueness, complexity or repetitive nature, rather than the reason for the request, which is not required to be stated." (Report adopted on request for advice by Belarus, ACCC/A/2014/1, para. 28).
23. In respect of a request which is voluminous or wide-ranging, within the meaning of article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations, it is clear that a request is not necessarily covered by the "manifestly unreasonable" exception just because it is voluminous or complex. Both article 7(2)(b) of the AIE Regulations and Article 3(2)(b) of the AIE Directive specifically envisage that public authorities will deal with voluminous or complex requests, albeit in a longer timeframe. I further note the parallel duty in Article 7(1) of the AIE Directive to ensure that public authorities organise environmental information with a view to its active and systematic dissemination to the public, and article 5 of the AIE Regulations which seeks to implement that provision. In his Opinion in C-217/97 Commission v Germany at paragraph 30, Advocate General Fennelly stated that the duty in Article 7 of the AIE Directive indicates that individual requests should, in principle, be on matters of detail. Accordingly, the fact that a request is detailed does not mean that it is necessarily unreasonable.
24. When considering whether a request is manifestly unreasonable, it is necessary to examine the impact on the public authority of dealing with the request. In particular, I must examine whether responding to the request would involve the public authority in disproportionate cost or effort, or would obstruct or significantly interfere with the normal course of its activities. In light of the findings of the Court of Justice of the European Union in T-2/03 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission, at paragraphs 101-115, I consider that the exception in article 9(2)(a) is only available where the administrative burden entailed by dealing with the request is particularly heavy. The burden is on the public authority to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the task entailed by the request. expect that if a public authority wishes to rely on the manifestly unreasonable nature of a request, that public authority will clearly demonstrate the actual and specific impact that dealing with the request would have on its normal activities.
25. It is also important to bear in mind article 5 of the AIE Regulations and Articles 7 and 3(5) of the AIE Directive, which place duties on public authorities to organise and actively disseminate environmental information, to support the public in seeking access to information and to put practical arrangements in place to ensure the effective exercise of the right to access environmental information. It is not within this Office's powers to examine the implementation of article 5 of the AIE Regulations or article 7 of the AIE Directive by public authorities. However, I am satisfied that the exemption in article 9(2)(a) is not intended to endorse any failure by a public authority to comply with its duties to organise and disseminate environmental information under those provisions. Furthermore, in every case, regard should be had to the purpose of the AIE Regime, as reflected in Recital 1 of the Preamble 6 to the AIE Directive, which provides that "increased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of such information contribute to greater public awareness of environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment." Accordingly, in cases involving article 9(2)(a) this Office may consider whether the information requested is the kind of environmental information that one would expect to be organised by the public authority in a manner that enables its easy dissemination.
26. In both its original and internal review decision Coillte refused the request on the basis of 9(2)(a), arising from its view that the request was manifestly unreasonable having regard to the volume or range of information sought and the time and resources that would have to be deployed in order to respond to the request.
27. Within the appellant's statement of appeal, his main contention was that he considered the time estimates set out by Coillte in its internal review to be exaggerated and also that he did not consider that Coillte has taken a reasonable approach to identifying the information requested.
28. Coillte did not provide a submission in this case, relying primarily on the contents of its internal review issued to the appellant on 29 November 2024. Within its fresh internal review, Coillte noted that the appellant's request as currently worded would “require the AIE Team to issue the request to numerous teams within the organisation and require them to indicate whether they hold any information relevant to the Request. The search through such a large number and range of records, or an examination of the kind of records concerned would place an unreasonable demand on Coillte's resources and would cause a substantial and unreasonable interference with the work of Coillte and would interfere with its ability to perform its core functions."
29. Coillte also noted that while the appellant refined the request time frame from a 19 month period to 12 month period, that he still declined to refine by geographical area. Coillte set out that it was suggested to the appellant at initial decision and fresh internal review stage that he should refine his request to a subset of forest numbers within any county of his choice. Coillte further added that "the reduction in timeline is somewhat futile as it is still necessary to engage with staff nationally to search, retrieve and review relevant information for the entire Coillte estate. The work involved to deal with the Request for the entire Estate over a 19-month period is equivalent as the work over a 12-month period."
30. With regard to further searches carried out, Coillte's new internal review also included the following:
"As part of the internal review process, I have carried out some further searches and engagement with the relevant SMEs namely the Estates and Establishment process leads, BAU Team leads and Estates Team leads. The Request is very broad and refers to all works related to firelines and all environmental information, associated with these works, across the whole estate. There are no easily retrievable documents held at central level containing this information. Works on firelines construction and maintenance are carried out in all BAUs and the records are kept locally within individual BAUs by relevant staff. In order to search for this information, the Estates and Establishment team leads in each BAU would need to carry out initial searches in their Sharepoint and Outlook folders.
An example of such a search was trialed on the email system of one Estates Team lead and it returned c. 200 emails that may fall within the scope of the Request. The search was carried out using key words such as "fire line", "fire lines", "fire break", "fire protection" , "fire plan". Each of these emails would have to be reviewed to check if it contains information relevant to the Request. Assuming that this task would take 5 minutes per email, this step would require approximately 16 hours to complete. Given that 40% of the initially searched emails may fall within the scope of the Request, the relevant number of emails (80) would need to be further reviewed and redacted for sensitive information. This work could take 10 minutes per email, which would take one Estates Team lead approximately 13 hours to complete. The two steps alone would require 29 hours per Estates and Establishment Team lead in one BAU. In addition, the records identified in steps one and two would need to be followed up with interviews and further engagement with relevant foresters (there are 6 to 8 foresters per BAU), who may hold additional information.
Some records could be challenging to locate as the engagement with NPWS or other relevant bodies could have occurred in the form of a phone call or site meeting with no minutes taken. This step could take additional 6 to 8 hours, or more, depending on the location and number of records identified in step one and two. Since the Request refers to the time period of August 2021 to August 2022 (after refinement) it should also be noted that it may be challenging to locate the records kept at local level due to substantial staff and office changes in Estates and Establishment teams since the date of the Request. In summary, all the above would require each BAU Estates and Establishment team lead to suspend their assigned duties for at a minimum 35 hours or 1 working week which is considered manifestly unreasonable and would result in an extraordinarily detrimental impact on the business".
31. Coillte also commented that that the following core responsibilities and tasks of each of the six Estates and Establishment Team leads would be affected and would adversely impact Coillte's and contractor businesses with considerable associated detrimental effects:
1. "Managing their respective teams of 3 to 4 foresters and up to 10 contractors
2. Processing contractor payments
3. Managing team budgets
4. Planning weekly work for contractors
5. Long term planning of operations
6. Responding to stakeholders calls including emergency reports
7. Sites visits and
8. Overall team management".
32. Coillte states that the time required to carry out these tasks would interfere with its other core functions. As above, Coillte submits that following a trial on the email system of one Estates team lead, which identified c. 200 emails, that the combined tasks of searching for and then reviewing emails that may fall within the scope of the Request, along with reviewing and redacting relevant emails for sensitive information, would require 29 hours per Estates and Establishment Team lead in one Business Area Unit (BAU).
33. This is based on Coillte's estimates of 5 minutes needed per email to decipher if it is relevant to the request, and a further 10 minutes per relevant identified email to review and redact any sensitive information. Coillte also set out that any records identified in the steps outlined above would then need to be followed up with interviews and further engagement with relevant foresters, of which there are 6-8 foresters per BAU, who may hold additional information.
34. Coillte has 6 BAU's around the country so the process as set out above would then need to be repeated per BAU for a full picture of any information which may exist.
35. Having considered Coillte’s new internal review decision, the Investigator wrote to Coillte with a number of further queries, which included seeking clarification from Coillte on if a reduction of the search terms to just 'fireline' and 'firebreak' would reduce the number of emails which would need to be reviewed and redacted. The Investigator also asked Coillte to outline if Coillte has any centralised system that monitors firelines across each BAU, and also if there any form of GIS mapping which could be utilised to search locations of known firelines and provide any relevant information to the appellant.
36. Within Coillte's response to these above queries, Coillte noted the following in relation to a reduction of the search terms in this request: "Reducing the search terms to just "fireline" and "firebreak" would not reduce the number of emails requiring review and redaction. The term "fireline" is the primary keyword that generates the volume of emails identified in the initial search".
37. In addition, Coillte set out to the Investigator that it "did not have a centralised system at the time of the AIE Request that monitors firelines across each BAU, nor is there any GIS mapping in place that could be utilised to search for the locations of known firelines or provide relevant attribute data".
38. I am satisfied broadly that Coillte's time estimates for the various tasks required to verify the relevance of each identified document to the request and to ascertain the releasability of each are sufficiently detailed to warrant credibility and that they indicate a requirement by Coillte to assign to the various tasks to relevant staff within the organisation that is capable of carrying out the review of the records and the application of any exempting AIE provisions.
39. I have had regard in this case to the volume and the range of information sought, the nature of the information requested, the task that must reasonably be undertaken to identify it, and the impact of dealing with the request on Coillte's other functions. I am mindful that the exception in 9(2)(a) is only available where the administrative burden entailed by dealing with the request is particularly heavy. I note in this regard that for a refusal under 9(2)(a) to be justified, it must be manifestly unreasonable, not just voluminous.
40. Article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations is an acknowledgement of the fact that public authorities should not be required to undertake the processing of AIE requests where to do so would place an unreasonable burden on what are often limited resources. In the circumstances of this case and having regard to Coillte's time estimates, which I find to be reasonable, and resources required, and the steps to be taken, I accept its contention that the processing of the request would place an unreasonable burden on it, involving disproportionate effort that would result in a significant interference with its other work. I am satisfied that the result would be a particularly heavy administrative burden on Coillte, specifically the Estate Team leads in each BAU. On the facts of this appeal, I find that the threshold under article 9(2)(a) has been met and that the request is manifestly unreasonable.
Article 10 of the AIE Regulations
41. Although I have found article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulations is engaged, that is not the end of the matter. It is necessary to weigh the public interest served by disclosure against the interest served by refusal as is required by articles 10(3) and (4) of the AIE Regulations.
42. In considering the public interest served by disclosure, it is important to be mindful of the purpose of the AIE regime, as reflected in Recital 1 of the Preamble to the AIE Directive, which provides that "increased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of such information contribute to greater public awareness of environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment." The AIE regime thereby recognises a very strong public interest in openness and transparency in relation to environmental decision-making.
43. The AIE regime also acknowledges that there may be exceptions to the general rule of disclosure of information, as noted in Recital 16 of the AIE Directive, which provides that "public authorities should be permitted to refuse a request for environmental information in specific and clearly defined cases". One such case is where the request is manifestly unreasonable having regard to the volume or range of information sought. The public interest in maintaining the exception lies in ensuring that the processing of AIE requests does not cause an unreasonable interference and/or disruption of the work of a public authority.
44. In its new internal review decision Coillte set out its consideration of the public interest served by disclosure, determining that "while the public has a right to access information on the workings of public bodies and accountability of decision making, in this case the arguments against release far outweigh those in favour. Release of this information would result in an onerous burden being placed on Coillte which would interfere with their core functions". In addition, Coillte outlined its position that it was satisfied that the public interest favours the withholding of the information requested, adding that "the public interest in ensuring that Coillte can perform its core functions outweighs the public interest in disclosure”.
45. As described above, Coillte's internal review also acknowledged article 10(5) of the AIE Regulations which states that "Nothing in article 8 or 9 shall authorise a public authority not to make available environmental information which, although held with information to which article 8 or 9 relates, may be separated from such information". This would include Coillte's reliance on article 9(2)(a) of the AIE Regulation in stating that the appellant's request is manifestly unreasonable. However, Coillte set out its view that "as the Request is manifestly unreasonable, there is no information that is capable of extraction as this would require a member of the team to go through each of the records, which as has been demonstrated, would be in itself manifestly unreasonable owing to the volume of records captured by the Request."
Does the public interest in refusal outweigh the public interest in disclosure?
46. In my view, there is a public interest in ensuring the proper administration of public authorities and ensuring that the administrative burden placed on them by virtue of the AIE Regulations is not unduly onerous or is such as could negatively affect their day-to-day administration or operations.
47. However, there is also undoubtedly a public interest in the openness and transparency with regard to how Coillte approaches the construction and maintenance of fire lines (which are intended to prevent future fires spreading and damaging residential areas, forest, or wildlife habitat).
48. A further factor to be taken into account in assessing the public interest, is that an effort was made by Coillte to try to reduce the administrative burden entailed in answering the request in this case by inviting engagement with the appellant, an effort that ultimately failed due to non-cooperation on the part of the appellant.
49. In all the circumstances, having regard to the nature of the request, the period of time to which it relates, the resources and the work required to attend to the request, particularly the requirement that each Estates and Establishment Team lead in Coillte's BAUs devote the hours equivalent to one working week each to this work, the resulting significant interference with the normal course of Coillte's activities, impacting negatively on the work it is required to carry out under statutory obligation, I accept Coillte's submissions relating to the public interest weighing in favour of refusal.
50. I emphasise that my conclusion in this case should not be taken to mean that public authorities may rely on the exception in article 9(2)(a) in respect of every request for voluminous or wide-ranging information. Each request to a public authority must be considered on its own particular facts. Public authorities have obligations under the AIE Directive and Regulations and must put in place adequate resources to comply with those obligations.
51. Having carried out a review under article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, I affirm Coillte’s decision.
52. A party to the appeal or any other person affected by this decision may appeal to the High Court on a point of law from the decision. Such an appeal must be initiated not later than two months after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
Gemma Farrell
on behalf of the Commissioner for Environmental Information