Decision
Mr. X and Dublin Port
From Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI)
Case number: OCE-153493-R5X3T1
Published on
From Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI)
Case number: OCE-153493-R5X3T1
Published on
Whether four records identified as coming within the scope of the appellant’s request for correspondence relating to the vacant site levy constitute “environmental information” within the meaning of article 3(1) of the AIE Regulations
22 May 2025
1. The appellant made a request, dated 3 September 2024, to the DPC for the following:
“a copy of all correspondence between Dublin Port and Dublin City Council with regard to the vacant site levy and its applicability to the Dublin Port lands in the period 1 January 2024 to date.”
2. The DPC, in its original decision of 27 September 2024, refused the request on the basis that it considered that the information sought is not “environmental information” under article 3(1) of the AIE Regulations and, in any event, article 9(1)(c) of the AIE Regulations applied.
3. On the same day, the appellant requested an internal review of that decision. The internal review decision of 25 October 2024, affirmed the original decision refusing the appellant’s request. The DPC noted that the information requested “is limited to a very small number of items of correspondence requesting payment of the site levy (together with associated invoice) and engaging on how the proceeds of the levy might be used in the future by Dublin City Council.”
4. The sole basis of the internal review decision was that the information sought is not environmental information as defined by article 3(1) of the AIE Regulations.
5. The appellant appealed to my Office on 6 November 2024.
6. I am directed by the Commissioner to carry out a review under article 12(5) of the Regulations. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the submissions made by the appellant and by the DPC. I have also examined the contents of the four records, provided by the DPC to this Office which the DPC identified as relevant to the appellant’s request. In addition, I have had regard to:
a. the judgments in Minch v Commissioner for Environmental Information [2017] IECA 223 (Minch), Redmond & Anor v Commissioner for Environmental Information & Anor [2020] IECA 83 (Redmond), Electricity Supply Board v Commissioner for Environmental Information & Lar Mc Kenna [2020] IEHC 190 (ESB No. 1), Right to Know v Commissioner for Environmental Information & RTÉ [2021] IEHC 353 (RTÉ) and Electricity Supply Board v Commissioner for Environmental Information [2024] IEHC 17 (ESB No. 2);
b. the judgment of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy v Information Commissioner [2017] EWCA Civ 844 (Henney) which is referenced in the decisions in Redmond, ESB No. 1, RTÉ and ESB No. 2;
c. the decision of the UK Upper Tribunal in Department for Transport, DVSA and Porsche Cars GB Ltd v Information Commissioner and John Cieslik [2018] UKUT 127 (AAC) (Porsche);
d. the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in C-321/96 Wilhelm Mecklenburg v Kreis Pinneberg - Der Landrat (Mecklenburg), C-316/01 Eva Glawischnig v Bundesminister für soziale Sicherheit und Generationen (Glawischnig) and C-470/19 Friends of the Irish Environment Ltd v Commissioner for Environmental Information (Friends of the Irish Environment);
e. the Guidance document provided by the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government on the implementation of the AIE Regulations (the Minister’s Guidance);
f. Directive 2003/4/EC (the AIE Directive), upon which the AIE Regulations are based;
g. the 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention); and
h. The Aarhus Convention—An Implementation Guide (Second edition, June 2014) (‘the Aarhus Guide’).
7. What follows does not comment or make findings on each and every argument advanced but all relevant points have been considered.
8. In accordance with article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, the role of this Office is to review the public authority’s internal review decision and to affirm, annul or vary it. Where appropriate in the circumstances of an appeal, I will require the public authority to make available environmental information to the appellant.
9. The Commissioner’s powers apply only in respect of environmental information held by or for a public authority. It is clear from the DPC’s internal review decision, along with its correspondence with this Office, that it is the DPC’s position that the information sought by the appellant, which it identified as a “very small number of items of correspondence” i.e. the four records provided to this Office, is not “environmental information” such that it falls within the remit of the AIE Regulations.
10. While the Commissioner’s practice has previously been to deal with this type of appeal by limiting the review solely to the “threshold” issue, in an effort to deal with this case expediently, the investigator dealing with this case wrote to the DPC and set out that should the Commissioner find that the information sought was environmental information, this decision would also consider whether the information sought was exempt from release under articles 8 or 9 of the AIE Regulations and invited submissions on any exemptions the DPC may wish to apply. I consider that this was an appropriate manner of dealing with this case based on its facts, in particular the small amount of records involved.
11. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the scope of this review concerns whether the four records identified as relevant by the DPC come within the definition of “environmental information” contained at article 3(1) of the Regulations. If I find that the records are environmental information, I will consider whether any exemptions under article 8 or 9 apply to the information sought.
Appellant’s Position
12. The appellant contends that the correspondence between the DPC and Dublin City Council regarding the vacant site levy and its applicability to the Dublin Port lands is environmental information within the meaning of article 3 (1) of the Regulations and it should, therefore, be disclosed. He states that the information sought is environmental information as it relates to a scheme intended to deal with vacant land. He states that the information falls squarely into category 3 (1) (c) of the Regulations; namely “any information…on:
(c) measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements and factors referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements,”
13. He states that the vacant site levy is a measure intended “to discourage land hoarding and open the land up for development (primarily in the context of a housing crisis ).”
14. Additionally, he states that, at the internal review stage, the DPC indicated that “some of the subject matter of the emails sought related to a discussion with Dublin City Council about how the money collected would be used if the levy were to be collected .” The appellant contends that this is expenditure that could affect and impact the urban environment.
The DPC’s Position
15. In addition to the detail set out in its original and internal review decisions, the DPC provided a submission, dated 28 November 2024, to this Office. In it, it contends that the information sought is not environmental information within the meaning of article 3(1).
16. It states that the information requested by the appellant is limited to a very small number of items of correspondence “requesting payment of the site levy (together with associated invoice) and engaging on how the proceeds of the levy might be used in the future by DCC.” Furthermore, “this correspondence details Dublin Port Company’s response to a request for payment of the vacant site levy. An ambition of the vacant site is that the money owed is invested in a local based community project, as allowed for under Section 23 (2) (b) (ii) of the Urban and Regeneration Housing Act, 2015 .”
17. The DPC contends that the appellant’s view that the relevant material falls squarely into category (c) and the measure is the vacant site levy, which is intended to discourage land hoarding and open it up for development (primarily in the context of a housing crisis) is “irrelevant” as DPC “has never engaged in land hoarding and has over the past number of years actively engaged with the Land Development Agency (LDA) in order to sell the site to them for housing development. The LDA opted not to purchase the site as there was a change in zoning which effectively removed residential as a use that was open for consideration under the Dublin City Development Plan .”
18. The DPC also contends that the “above approach undertaken ” cannot be construed as an administrative measure “as no agreement has been reached with DCC to date. The issue of environmental as defined by Article 3(1) in our view only applies when agreement is reached with DCC. It is at this point that the issue of environmental information, if any arises .”
19. Finally, as stated, in its original decision, the DPC had referred to the exemption under article 9(1)(c) of the AIE Regulations in refusing access to the records sought. In the interests of efficiency, the DPC was provided with an opportunity to make any observations or submissions on whether any exemptions under articles 8 or 9 of the AIE Regulations applied in respect of the records in question. By email dated 2 May 2025, the DPC stated that they did not intend to rely on any such exemptions.
Analysis and Findings
Definition of “environmental information ”
20. Environmental information is defined in article 3(1) of the Regulations and article 2(1) of the Directive as “any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form on:
(a) the state of the elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape and natural sites including wetlands, coastal and marine areas, biological diversity and its components, including genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements;
(b) factors, such as substances, energy, noise, radiation or waste, including radioactive waste, emissions, discharges and other releases into the environment, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment referred to in (a);
(c) measures (including administrative measures), such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) as well as measures or activities designed to protect those elements;
(d) reports on the implementation of environmental legislation;
(e) cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of the measures and activities referred to in (c); and
(f) the state of human health and safety, including the contamination of the food chain, where relevant, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built structures inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the environment referred to in (a), or, through those elements, by any of the matters referred to in (b) and (c).”
21. The AIE Regulations transpose the AIE Directive at national level. The AIE Directive was adopted to give effect to the first pillar of the Aarhus Convention in order to increase public access to environmental information and enable an informed public to participate more effectively in environmental decision-making. It replaced Council Directive 90/313/EC, the previous AIE Directive.
22. According to national and EU case, while the concept of “environmental information” as defined in the AIE Directive is broad (Mecklenburg at paragraph 19), there must be more than a minimal connection with the environment (Glawischnig at paragraph 25). Information does not have to be intrinsically environmental to fall within the scope of the definition (Redmond at paragraph 58; see also ESB No. 1 at paragraph 43). However, a mere connection or link to the environment is not sufficient to bring information within the definition of environmental information. Otherwise, the scope of the definition would be unlimited in a manner that would be contrary to the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the CJEU. However, the right of access under the AIE Regulations is to information “on” one or more of the six categories at (a) to (f) of the definition. Under Article 3(1)(c) the connection between the information and the environment is found in the measure in question and not necessarily in the information itself.
23. Paragraph (c) requires the identification of a relevant measure or activity, which the information sought is “on ”. Information may be “on ” more than one measure or activity (Henney at paragraph 42). In identifying the relevant measure or activity, one may consider the wider context and is not strictly limited to the precise issue with which the information is concerned (ESB No. 1 at paragraph 43). The list of examples of measures and activities given at paragraph (c) is not exhaustive, but it contains illustrative examples (Redmond at paragraph 55). The CJEU stated in Mecklenburg that the term “measure ” serves “merely to make it clear that the acts governed by the directive included all forms of administrative activity ” (Mecklenburg at paragraph 20), and a similarly expansive approach should be taken to the term ‘activity’ (RTÉ at paragraph 19).
24. As stated, the appellant sought access to a copy of all correspondence between DPC and Dublin City Council “with regard to the vacant site levy and its applicability to the Dublin Port lands ” during a specific period. In its internal review decision, the DPC stated “the information you have requested is limited to a very small number of items of correspondence requesting payment of the site levy (together with associated invoice) and engaging on how the proceeds of the levy might be used in the future by Dublin City Council .”
25. As outlined, the DPC contends that the information sought cannot be construed as an administrative measure “as no agreement has been reached with DCC to date. The issue of environmental information, as defined by Article 3(1), in our view only applies when agreement is reached with DCC. It is at this point that the issue of environmental information, if any arises.”
26. With regard to whether an agreement between bodies is integral to whether something can be considered a measure, article 3 (1) (c) does not set out any such conditionality. It specifically refers to measures “such as policies, legislation, plans, programmes, environmental agreements, and activities affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment ”.
27. This is reflected in relevant case law. As stated above, the list of examples of measures and activities given at paragraph (c) of article 3 (1) is not exhaustive, but it contains illustrative examples (Redmond at paragraph 55) and the term “measure” serves “merely to make it clear that the acts governed by the directive included all forms of administrative activity ” (Mecklenburg at paragraph 20). A similarly expansive approach should be taken to the term “activity ” (RTÉ at paragraph 19). It is, therefore, clear that an inclusive approach to forms of administrative activity should be taken when identifying a “measure ”. The interpretation is not, therefore, intended to be limited to administrative activity where agreement between two public bodies has been reached in relation to specifics of implementation of administrative activity.
28. If such an interpretation of the regulations were required, in my view, it would be likely to fly in the face of the stated objectives of the Aarhus Convention which are to increase public access to environmental information and enable an informed public to participate more effectively in environmental decision-making. The release of environmental information relevant to a decision may be of limited benefit in furthering the objective of enabling public participation in environmental decision-making where such information could only be considered for release after the relevant decision had already been made.
29. Furthermore, having examined the DPC’s decisions and submissions to this Office, I must acknowledge that in identifying the relevant measure or activity, one may consider the wider context and is not strictly limited to the precise issue with which the information is concerned (ESB at paragraph 43). I am also cognisant that, in identifying the relevant measure or activity, information may be “on ” more than one measure or activity. The DPC identified the four records at issue as coming within the scope of the appellant’s request for correspondence between Dublin Port and DPC with regard to the vacant site levy and its applicability to the Dublin Port lands during a specific period.
30. I consider it useful to set out some detail regarding the vacant site levy at this point. The vacant site levy was an annual charge, payable retrospectively, under the Urban Regeneration and Housing Act 2015 (as amended) by owners of vacant or idle land in circumstances where the land had been entered on the Vacant Sites Register. The charge was initially set at 3% of a vacant site's market value but was increased to 7% in 2019. According to Dublin City Council, the purpose of the levy was to incentivise development of disused or under-used land. The Council specifies on its website:
“The Urban Regeneration and Housing Act, 2015, (as amended) made provision for a vacant site levy to incentivise the development of vacant and under-utilised sites in urban areas for housing and regeneration purposes. The Act enables local authorities to provide a specific objective in their development plan for the development and re-use of vacant sites in specific locations within urban areas where it is considered beneficial towards securing the objectives of the core strategy .”
31. Under Section 23 (1) of the Urban and Regeneration Housing Act 2015, the proceeds of the vacant site levy are to be used for specified purposes; either the provision of housing on residential land or on the development and renewal of “regeneration land”.
32. In accordance with Part 22A of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (as amended), a new Residential Zoned Land Tax (RZLT) was introduced, replacing the vacant site levy. According to Dublin City Council website:
“_Both the Vacant Site Levy and the Residential Zoned Land Tax are measures to activate land and planning permission for development. Both measures encourage the development or redevelopment of zoned land. The Residential Zoned Land Tax has a wider scope, with an aim to encourage all zoned and serviced land which meets the criteria to be brought forward for development over the short to medium term.
The tax measure will replace the Vacant Site Levy in 2025, however the levy will continue to apply and accrue until the charge on land associated with the tax is levied on 1 February 2025 in accordance with section 653Q of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. Any outstanding charges in respect of the vacant site levy will remain against the land in question to be collected by the local authority_.”
33. From all the foregoing, I am satisfied that the payment of the vacant site levy by DPC is a “measure ” within the meaning of paragraph 3(1)(c) of the Regulations. As measures have been defined as all forms of administrative activity, everything that both Dublin City Council and the DPC do in relation to the administration of this levy can also be individual measures. But the overall context here is that the DPC must pay money to Dublin City Council on foot of the vacant site levy. I would caution against an excessively legalistic approach to the identification of the “correct ” measure. In my view the Irish and European courts not indicated that there is one clear and precise answer to the identification of a measure. Rather, the courts have indicated that the focus should be on whether the measure affects or is likely to affect the environment.
Whether the measure or activity is affecting, likely to affect or designed to protect the environment
34. Having established that the payment of the vacant site levy is a measure, in accordance with the elements contained in article 3 (1) (a), (b) and (c) of the regulations, I will now consider whether the measure affects, is likely to affect or is designed to protect the environment.
35. A measure or activity is “likely to affect ” the elements and factors of the environment if there is a real and substantial possibility that it will affect the environment, whether directly or indirectly. Collins J, delivering judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal in Redmond, noted that “something more than a remote or theoretical possibility is required (because that would sweep too widely and could result in the ‘general and unlimited right of access’ that Glawischnig indicates the AIE Directive was not intended to provide) but it is not necessary to establish the probability of a relevant environmental impact (because that would, in my opinion, sweep too narrowly and risk undermining the fundamental objectives of the AIE Directive) ” (paragraph 63).
36. Given its purpose to encourage development of vacant sites, there is a strong likelihood that the payment of the vacant site levy will affect the elements and factors of the environment. The fact that DPC asserts that it has “never engaged in land hoarding ” and has engaged with the Land Development Agency in order to sell the site for housing development is not relevant to the question of whether the vacant site levy is a measure or activity affecting, likely to affect or designed to protect the environment. Having considered the contents of the relevant records in this appeal, and while I cannot give detail on the contents of the records, I note that they concern one particular site, and I consider that the payment of the vacant site levy is likely to affect the environment of that site, as it will act as an incentive for the DPC to develop that site.
37. Furthermore, under Section 23 (1) of the Urban and Regeneration Housing Act 2015, the proceeds of the vacant site levy are to be used for specified purposes; either the provision of housing on residential land or on the development and renewal of “regeneration land ”. Both scenarios involve the development of land and, therefore, are likely to affect the elements and factors of the environment.
38. In this regard, in its submissions of 28 November 2024, the DPC stated that “it is an ambition of the vacant site levy that the money owed is invested in a local based community project, as allowed for under Section 23 (2) (b) (ii) of the Urban and Regeneration Housing Act, 2015 .” This section specifies that where the vacant site comprises regeneration land the money may, in particular, be used for:
“(ii)the provision, or facilitation of the provision, of services and facilities for the local community, including education, training, childcare, recreational, leisure, artistic and cultural facilities and the renovation and extension of existing services and facilities ,”
39. The relevant records also contain information on the use of the vacant site levy to be paid by the DPC, which will clearly have an affect on the environment where relevant project under the above provision is to be carried out.
40. As stated, a measure or activity is “likely to affect ” the elements and factors of the environment if there is a real and substantial possibility that it will affect the environment, whether directly or indirectly. Along with the purpose of the levy to encourage development of vacant sites, it is clear that, under Section 23, the use of the proceeds of the levy, including any such project under Section 23 (2) (b), involves the development of land and, as such, it is likely to affect the elements and factors of the environment.
41. The vacant site levy is “likely to affect ” the elements and factors of the environment as there is a real and substantial possibility that it will affect the environment directly or indirectly. As referred to, the levy was introduced to incentivise development of disused or under-used land.
42. In light of all of the above, I find, that the vacant site levy is a measure likely to affect the environment.
Whether the information sought is “on” the relevant measure or activity
43. Having regard to the wording of article 3 (1) of the regulations, it now falls to be considered whether the information sought is information “on” a relevant measure. As “any information … on ” a measure or activity affecting or likely to affect the environment is prima facie environmental information, the information at issue does not, in itself, have to affect or be likely to affect the environment in order to constitute information “on ” such a measure (Redmond at paragraphs 57 and 59). As the High Court outlined in its decision in the ESB No. 1 case, relying on the English Court of Appeal decision in Henney, that information is “on ” a measure if it is about, relates to or concerns the measure (see paragraph 41 of ESB No. 1, referring to paragraph 37 in Henney). The question as to whether information is “on ” a measure is fact and context specific. This question is to be considered by reference to the Directive and Aarhus Convention. According to Henney, the recitals to both the Directive and Convention “give an indication of how the very broad language of the text of the provisions may have to be assessed and provide a framework for determining the question of whether in a particular case information can properly be described as "on" a given measure ” (at paragraph 48).
44. Importantly, while Henney uses the terms “critical ”, “fundamental ” or “integral ”, it did so to describe the relationship between the communications and data component of the smart meter plan and the overall smart meter plan. There was a dispute in that case between the parties as to what was the correct measure. The Court did not use these terms to say that for information to be on a measure it had to be critical, fundamental or integral to that measure.
45. I note the purposive test as articulated in Henney. The Court of Appeal in Redmond noted that the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in Henney suggests that, in determining whether information is “on ” the relevant measure or activity, it may be relevant to consider the purpose of the information such as why it was produced, how important it is to that purpose, how it is to be used, and whether access to it advances the purposes of the Aarhus Convention and AIE Directive (see Redmond at paragraph 99). Information that does not advance the purposes of the Aarhus Convention and AIE Directive may not be “on ” the relevant measure or activity (Redmond at paragraph 99). The test set out in Henney was also explicitly endorsed by the High Court in the RTÉ case (see paragraph 52) and is also referenced in the recent ESB No. 2 judgment.
46. In this case, as stated, the appellant is seeking a copy of all correspondence between DPC and Dublin City Council, specifically with regard to the vacant site levy and its applicability to the Dublin Port lands. The DPC identified four relevant records. I am satisfied that the four records at issue can reasonably be described as follows:
• Record 1 – Email from DPC to Dublin City Council, dated 31 May 2024, providing information as to how the vacant site levy could be used in the context of a particular project (attaches images of proposed project, which, although not provided to this Office, if they exist, I also consider to comprise part of Record 1 and to fall within scope of this review)
• Record 2 - Email from DPC to Dublin City Council, dated 17 June 2024, seeking follow-up regarding Record 1
• Record 3 – Email from Dublin City Council to DPC, dated 19 June 2024, containing response to Record 1 and details relating to levy amounts
• Record 4 – Letter from Dublin City Council to DPC, dated 26 June 2024, regarding levy amounts
47. In my opinion, the four records identified constitute information “on ” the vacant site levy which, as discussed above, is a measure affecting or likely to affect the environment. The four records constitute information “on ” the measure as they include information on the levy payable and information on how the money could be used to develop the land in accordance with Section 23 (2) (b) (ii) of the Urban and Regeneration Housing Act, 2015. They are all about, relate to and concern the levy. They are, in summary, correspondence between two public authorities about the obligation of one to pay the levy to the other.
48. Further, as referenced in the Aarhus Implementation Guide, Article 7 of the Convention covers “public participation in the development of plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment, which include sectoral or land-use plans, environmental action plans, and environmental policies at all levels”. Recital 1 of the AIE Directive also makes clear, that the purpose of the AIE regime is to promote “increased public access to environmental information and the dissemination of such information ” in order to “contribute to a greater awareness of environmental matters, a free-exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-making and, eventually, to a better environment .”
49. The vacant site levy clearly has an environmental effect. In allowing the public to access information on payment and how it is proposed that the vacant site levy is to be deployed to develop lands and to further specific projects for community benefit, it will enable the public to have greater input into decision-making concerning the development of the relevant lands. This in turn would also enable the public to engage in a more informed debate over any potential issues and provide the opportunity to highlight any concerns which may arise.
50. As outlined above, I am satisfied that the four records identified as relevant amount to information “on ” the vacant site levy.
51. Having considered the above, it is my view that the four records identified as relevant to the appellant’s request of 3 September 2024 to the DPC for “a copy of all correspondence between Dublin Port and Dublin City Council with regard to the vacant site levy and its applicability to the Dublin Port lands in the period 1 January 2024 to date ” fall within the definition of “environmental information ” in article 3(1)(c) of the AIE Regulations, and therefore, the DPC was not justified in refusing the request on that basis.
52. I note that the DPC, when offered the opportunity, did not provide any further submissions seeking to rely on any of the exemptions contained in articles 8 or 9 of the AIE Regulations. DPC did refer to article 9(1)(c) in its original decision on this request, and affirmed this decision at internal review stage. A number of elements are required in order to engage the exemption provided for in this article:
a. a. The information must be commercial or industrial in nature.
b. b. The confidentiality of the information must be provided for by law.
c. c. The confidentiality is protecting a legitimate economic interest.
d. d. The confidentiality would be adversely affected by disclosure.
53. The decision of the DPC does not address any of the above elements, and the DPC should note that mere reference to a statutory provision is not sufficient to establish that information is exempt under the AIE Regulations. I have considered the content of the information sought, and I do not consider that the confidentiality of this information is protecting the legitimate economic interests of the DPC or any other party. I do not see how there could be any adverse affect on those legitimate economic interests from the release of this information. Accordingly, I find that article 9(1)(c) does not apply to the information sought.
54. In the circumstances, I consider that the most appropriate course of action to take is for me to annul the DPC’s decision and direct release of the records at issue.
55. Having carried out a review under article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, on behalf of the Commissioner for Environmental Information, I annul the DPC’s internal review decision and I direct release of the four records in question.
56. A party to the appeal or any other person affected by this decision may appeal to the High Court on a point of law from the decision. Such an appeal must be initiated not later than two months after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
______________________
Julie O’Leary
On Behalf of the Commissioner for Environmental Information