Decision
Save Leitrim CLG and Coillte
From Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI)
Case number: OCE-143263-P9B0N9
Published on
From Office of the Commissioner for Environmental Information (OCEI)
Case number: OCE-143263-P9B0N9
Published on
1. On 12 July 2023, the appellant organisation submitted a request to Coillte for the following information:
“Correspondence from August 2022 (including any attachments) between Coillte and Soil Association Certification in connection with the certification audit undertaken by that body of Coillte in and around May 2022.
We are aware of correspondence from 5-8-23 and 23-8-23.”
2. Coillte acknowledged the request by email dated 28 July 2023 and noted that a final decision was due by 11 August 2023. The acknowledgement email further set out Coillte’s position in terms of the charging of fees for the supply of environmental information, including the headings of the items that it would charge fees for and the circumstances in which they would charge a reduced fee.
3. Coillte subsequently contacted the appellant on 1 August 2023 in order to clarify whether the reference in the request to ‘5-8-23 and 23-8-23’ should instead refer to ‘5-8-22 and 23-8-22’, which the appellant agreed with by way of reply dated 2 August 2023.
4. Coillte were required to issue a decision on the appellant’s request within one month of its request. No such decision was provided to the appellants by the date. The appellant subsequently requested an internal review of their request by way of email dated 13 August 2023 on the basis of deemed refusal.
5. Coillte furnished the appellant with its internal review decision on 11 September 2023. The internal review decision varied the deemed refusal in respect of the appellant’s request by granting the appellant all four of the records which were identified by Coillte as being relevant to the appellant’s request. Coillte also provided the appellant with a Schedule of Records relating to the released records, which notes that the records were being released in full and without the application of any exemptions“subject to payment of fees as per Article 15 of Regulations”.
6. Further to the release of these records, Coillte referred to Article 15(1)(a) of the Regulations and stated as follows:
“Article 15(1)(a) of the AIE Regulations allows a public authority to charge a reasonable fee for the provision of environmental information. In that regard, Coillte is within its rights to charge you for the provision of information in relation to your Request, provided such charge is reasonable. Any amount that is reasonable will not be considered as having a deterrent effect on persons wishing to obtain information or as restricting their right of access to information.
As internal reviewer, I consider the appropriateness and reasonability of the charge. This entailed examination of the basis of the charge, the extent of the material captured by your Request, and the overall resources necessary to supply the information to you.
The basis on which the charge of €30 was calculated and set out in the attached invoice.
The fee is based on: search and retrieval time; time spent locating relevant files/data sources; collating relevant documents contained on those files/data sources; examining the documents, considering exemptions, and scheduling the records.
I am satisfied that the time spent on the Request has been accurately recorded, the work involved clearly set out, the fees calculated in a transparent manner and the subsequent charge correctly applied.
In being strictly limited to reimbursement for man-hours spent on the request, I am satisfied that the charge is reasonable.”
7. The internal review decision enclosed an invoice dated 13 September 2024, which outlines the 30EUR fee as comprising 1.5 hours for“search, retrieval, compilation & copying” at a rate of 20EUR per hour.
8. The appellant lodged an appeal of the internal review decision to this Office on 22 October 2023. In the request, the appellant states:
“We paid the fee and received the records but now wish to appeal the decision as we are of the view that the fee is unreasonable on the basis of
1)it should not have taken Coillte one and a half hours to locate the information provided - we were very specific in the information that we sought.
2)some of the information charged for is actually publicly available (Soil Association Report) - we did not know this at the time of making the request
3)The findings and recommendations in ACCC case ACCC/C/2017/147 (para. 89) would indicate that Coillte's fee is based on charging for work that they should not be charging for, i.e. indirect costs.
Details of the request and our request for an internal review are contained within the attached internal review decision. We have also included the Invoice and the Schedule of Records that Coillte provided to us.”
9. The appellant provided this Office with a copy of email correspondence between it and Coillte between the dates of 11 September and 18 October 2023. The correspondence relates to the appellant’s queries on the available payment options regarding the release of the requested information. The correspondence further includes the appellant’s confirmation by email dated 9 October 2023 that the bank transfer was made to Coillte, and Coillte’s confirmation of the receipt of payment dated 18 October 2023. Coillte’s email of 18 October also attaches the four records that were found to be within the scope of the appellant’s request.
10. I am directed by the Commissioner to carry out a review under article 12(5) of the Regulations. In carrying out my review, I have had regard to the submissions made by the appellant and Coillte. In addition, I have had regard to:
• the Guidance document provided by the Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government on the implementation of the AIE Regulations (the Minister’s Guidance);
• Directive 2003/4/EC (the AIE Directive), upon which the AIE Regulations are based;
• the 1998 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention); and
• The Aarhus Convention—An Implementation Guide (Second edition, June 2014) (‘the Aarhus Guide’).
11. What follows does not comment or make findings on each and every argument advanced but all relevant points have been considered.
12. In accordance with article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, my role is to review the public authority's internal review decisions and to affirm, annul or vary them. Article 11(5) of the regulations sets out that a reference to a request being refused, in whole or in part information includes a request that has not been dealt with in accordance with Articles 3, 4 or 5 of the AIE Directive, including the ground that the amount of the fee charged under article 15(1) is excessive.
13. In this appeal, Coillte has decided to grant the appellant’s request, subject to payment of a fee which has been paid by the appellant. Coillte identified 4 records, one which was later found to be publically available online. In recognition of this, Coillte amended its charge to 15EUR for the remaining 3 records at issue. This was put to the appellant who wanted to continue with the appeal.
14. The appellant submits that the fee charge by Coillte in this case is not reasonable. As such the scope of my review in each case is confined to whether or not the request has been dealt with in accordance with Article 5(2) of the AIE Directive (implemented by article 15(1) of the AIE Regulations).
15. In addition to the points set out in the appellant’s preliminary submission (set out in paragraph 8 above), it also made a number of additional points which can be broadly summarised as follows:
- The appellant is a voluntary community group with no fixed income - dependent on fund-raising and donations from supporters. While 15EUR is not a lot of money, it places an extra burden on its finances. Coillte has taken no account of its means to pay the fee.
- Coillte's policy to reduce a fee only on production of a medical card, is discriminatory against groups like theirs who are seeking to protect the local community based on voluntary input.
- There is a cumulative impact of the fees on the appellant’s ability to pay and Coillte’s charges are a deterrent.
- The question must be asked how much is paid by Coillte in terms of administration to charge for and process small requests such as this – and that the sole purpose of the application of the charge is to deter requesters.
- Coillte has not provided a persuasive breakdown of how it took 1.5 hours to process the request. The reasonableness of the fee cannot be assessed if they have not provided a detailed breakdown
- The charging for creating a schedule of records is not justified.
16. Coillte provided its submission to this Office on 7 December 2023. Its points in relation to the reasonableness of the fee can be broadly summarised as follows:
- Coillte are entitled to charge a fee in line with the Directive and cited recital 18 of the preamble of the Directive and article 5(1) of the Directive
- The Charge was calculated based on 1.5 hours of work. Coillte’s AIE Team performed the following tasks in identifying the Information: a.Engagement with a senior member of Coillte staff, who is a subject matter expert, for instruction;
ob. Retrieval of the information likely falling within the Request from Coillte’s database;
oReview of the resulting information to ensure that no information appeared to be missing.
oConsideration of any exemptions pursuant to the AIE Regulations, which would not permit Coillte to disclose the underlying information; and
oReview of the Information and compilation of a schedule to provide to the Appellant.”
- In relation to the appellant’s assertion that it should not have taken 1.5 hours to identify 4 records, Coillte commented that there is no correlation between the number of records identified and the amount of time required to complete searches to the extent required by the AIE Regulations. The AIE Team must consult with the appropriate Subject Matter Expert who must in turn locate the relevant files/data sources, collate the relevant documents contained on those files/data sources and examine the documents with regard to possible required redaction and analyse same with regard to any exemptions that may apply under the AIE Regulations. The records must also be scheduled
- Coillte does not agree with the appellants’ interpretation of the Moldova Findings, which allow for the imposition of reasonable fees in making environmental information available. The charge is reasonable because they are not excessive, they relate directly to the work involved in producing the environmental information and they are broken down in a simple schedule.
- That the charge applied in this case is in line with the findings of the ECJ inEast Sussex , that the charge may include the costs attributable to the time spent by the staff of the public authority concerned on answering an individual request for information, including the time spent on searching for the information and putting it in the form required.
- The charges applied by Coillte for the purpose of this request cannot reasonably be assessed as having a deterrent effect given the level of the charges and the fact that Coillte, on acknowledging receipt of the request by email of 28 July 2023 (attached to this submission), informed the appellant of additional reductions available having regard to their means. The appellant did not engage with Coillte in that regard and did indeed proceed to pay the fee
- With regards the appellants point relating to the cumulative impact of fees – it is not mandatory to consider historic charges for the release of environmental information that were paid by an applicant, as this would potentially create an administrative quagmire, eg the decision maker would need to consider whether there would be a temporal limit. If the Commissioner accedes to the notion that charges levied for historic AIE requests must be considered when deciding whether to raise a charge for the release of information on the foot of an entirely separate AIE request, then this interpretation would stray beyond Article 5(2) of the Directive
17. Article 5 of Directive 2003/4/EC provides:
“1. Access to any public registers or lists established and maintained as mentioned in Article 3(5) and examination in situ of the information requested shall be free of charge.
2. Public authorities may make a charge for supplying any environmental information but such charge shall not exceed a reasonable amount.
3. Where charges are made, public authorities shall publish and make available to applicants a schedule of such charges as well as information on the circumstances in which a charge may be levied or waived.”
18. Article 15(1) of the AIE Regulations broadly transposes article 5 of the Directive and provides as follows:
“(a) A public authority may charge a fee when it makes available environmental information in accordance with these Regulations (including when it makes such information available following an appeal to the Commissioner under article 12), provided that such fee shall be reasonable having regard to the Directive.
(b) Notwithstanding sub-article (a), a public authority shall not charge a fee for access to any public registers or lists of environmental information pursuant to article 5(1)(d).
(c) Notwithstanding sub-article (a), a public authority shall not charge a fee for the examination in situ of information requested.
(d) Where an applicant examines information in situ and wishes to obtain copies of that information, a public authority may charge a fee, consistent with the list of fees specified under article 15(2) for the provision of such copies.”
19. The question to be addressed here is whether the fee of 15EUR, imposed by Coillte in this case, was reasonable in the context of the requirements of article 15(1) of the AIE Regulations. Neither the Directive nor the Regulations define what is“reasonable” in this context, therefore to determine what is meant by“reasonable” I have had regard to the relevant case law. The question of what is reasonable in this context will also encompass the question of what a public authority is and is not permitted to charge for when supplying information.
20. In his opinion inCommission v Germany which concerned Directive 90/313/EEC (the predecessor of the current AIE Directive), Advocate General Fennelly considered that the notion of what is“reasonable” must be interpreted in light of the general scheme and purpose of the Directive. In light of this,“the question of whether the charges for the supply of the information are ‘reasonable’ must be judged from the perspective of the member of the public requesting the information, rather than from that of the public authority” (paragraph 23).
21. The Advocate General’s view was that, unlike most other categories of publicly held information, the likely cost will inevitably have a direct bearing on the extent to which the public will use the right of access. He considered that“requiring the individual seeker of information to bear what is effectively the entire cost of processing his request would amount to restricting the enjoyment of the right of access, in practice if not in law, to those who have a direct interest in the information, contrary to the clear exclusion of the need for such an interest” (paragraph 25).
22. He also noted that“[s]ince access to environmental information is in the public interest, it follows that the public authorities, and, ultimately, the general public through the State budget, should bear that part of the burden of making this information available which is represented by the time and effort of public officials” (paragraph 24).
23. He was“of the opinion that Article 5 [of the AIE Directive] should be interpreted as allowing the Member States to charge either a standard scale of fees, which need not be based directly on the direct costs, or a charge based directly on such costs” but that“in neither case may the fee or the charge exceed an amount which is equivalent to reasonable, direct costs, or be such as to permit the charging out of part of the cost and time of a public authority in performing a public duty” (paragraph 32).
24. In Case C-71/14,East Sussex County Council v Information Commissioner , the Court of Justice found that all of the factors on the basis of which the amount of the charge is calculated must relate to the actual costs of supplying the requested information. This may include the costs attributable to the time spent by the staff of the public authority concerned on answering an individual request for information, including the time spent on searching for the information and putting it in the form required.
25. The Court found that the expression“reasonable amount” in the AIE Directive does not include any amount that may have a deterrent effect on persons wishing to obtain information or that may restrict their right of access to information. The Court found that“in order to assess whether a charge…has a deterrent effect, account must be taken both of the economic situation of the person requesting the information and of the public interest in the protection of the environment. That assessment cannot therefore relate solely to the person’s economic situation but must also be based on an objective analysis of the amount of the charge.”
26. The appellant has stated that the Commissioner should take into account the“cumulative impact” of the fees that Coillte have charged it for AIE requests. It says the cumulative impact of such fees amounts to a deterrent on it requesting environmental information.
27. The role of the Commissioner under article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations is to review the internal review decision made by a public authority in relation to a particular request, and to affirm, vary or annul that decision. I consider that the question before me is the reasonableness of the particular fee charged in this instance in relation to this particular request. In considering whether this fee is reasonable having regard to the AIE Directive (as required by article 15(1)(a) of the AIE Regulations), I do not consider that it would be appropriate for me to take into account charges in relation to previous AIE requests made by the appellant for information held by or for Coillte.
28. There is nothing in the AIE Regulations, AIE Directive or inEast Sussex (the leading ECJ authority on fees) that suggests that when considering the reasonableness of a fee, account can or should be taken of charges imposed in relation to previous AIE requests made by the appellant. Due to this, I consider that the reasonableness of each individual fee should be assessed on a case by case basis. The effect of this is that if an appellant makes multiple AIE requests to a public authority then in theory it may be charged multiple fees (as long as it is reasonable to do so on the facts of that particular case). This is similar to when an appellant brings an appeal to this Office – a set fee is charged, which does not vary based on how many other appeals may have been brought by the appellant to this Office.
29. However, while I do not consider it appropriate to consider the cumulative effect of charges in relation to previous AIE requests on the appellant - the ECJ inEast Sussex is quite clear that account should be taken of the economic situation as a whole of the requester when a public authority considers the reasonableness of a fee in relation to environmental information.
30. To determine whether the charge imposed by Coillte in this case has a deterrent effect on the person or organisation wishing to obtain the information or that may restrict their access to information, the economic situation of the requestor must be considered. Coillte, in correspondence to the appellant confirming receipt of the request for information stated“Coillte may reduce the rate to €6.00 per hour having regard to the means of the applicant (on production of evidence) ”. Coillte said in submission to this Office of 30 August 2024 that it has updated the wording on its website in relation to the circumstances in which a charge will be reduced. It states“Coillte will reduce the rate to €6.00 per hour having regard to the means of the applicant (on production of evidence). ”
31. The appellant has said Coillte’s requirement that a medical card be produced in order to avail of the reduced rate of 6EUR, is discriminatory and disadvantages ENGOs as they are not a natural person. I note however that rather than solely requesting evidence of means in the form of a medical card, Coillte has stated the reduced rate may be applied“on production of evidence” . Coillte also emailed the appellant on 9 October 2023 when it enquired about payment options stating “if (the appellant) wishes to engage with Coillte in relation to their means to pay, please feel free to do so” . I consider the onus, at this point, was on the appellant to engage with Coillte in order to demonstrate its economic situation– which it does not appear to have done. The fact the appellant is an environmental NGO does not, in and of itself, demonstrate that its economic circumstances warrant a reduced rate.
32. I consider Coillte has done enough in this case to take into account the economic situation of the requestor, and that in providing for such a reduced rate (which does not appear to be limited to natural persons) Coillte has acted appropriately. As stated, it is up to the appellant to engage with Coillte regarding what evidence it could produce in order to demonstrate that a reduced rate should be applied in this case.
33. For the second limb of the test to determine whether the charge in this case has a deterrent effect, charge must be objectively reasonable – and how Coillte calculated the charge is relevant in this regard. The appellant asserts that Coillte has not provided a satisfactory breakdown of the time taken by it to search for, retrieve and collate the information, therefore the fee cannot be said to be reasonable. The appellant also says that, in any event, 1.5 hours to search, retrieve and compile 4 records is excessive.
34. Coillte has set out the basis on which it says the charge was calculated stating it charged a fee of 20EUR per hour for 1.5 hours of work (later reduced to a total of 15EUR). Coillte has set out what was involved in this work and how the 1.5 hour time frame was arrived at as follows:“Coillte’s AIE Team performed the following tasks in identifying the Information: a. Engagement with a senior member of Coillte staff, who is a subject matter expert, for instruction; b. Retrieval of the information likely falling within the Request from Coillte’s database; c Review of the resulting information to ensure that no information appeared to be missing. d. Consideration of any exemptions pursuant to the AIE Regulations, which would not permit Coillte to disclose the underlying information; and e. Review of the Information and compilation of a schedule to provide to the Appellant.”
35. Looking at the wording of the appellant’s request – correspondence from August 2022 (including any attachments) between Coillte and Soil Association Certification in connection with the certification audit undertaken by that body of Coillte in and around May 2022 - I would have expected Coillte’s explanation as to how it came to the 1.5 hour timeframe to involve searches of relevant email accounts, in addition to the database search it outlined. I say this bearing in mind the records identified by Coillte as being relevant to the request include two email correspondence records. It is somewhat surprising that Coillte’s explanation of why it took 1.5 hours to search, retrieve and collate the information does not explicitly mention such searches.
36. But I note that Coillte have now reduced the fee to 15EUR, which would equate to about 45 minutes of search, retrieval and compilation. Due to this, I do not think it is necessary for me to ask Coillte for further detail as to how the 1.5 hours were reached, as even if it was found that it took less time than Coillte originally set out, it is not likely to have taken less than 45 minutes in all. I say this based on the circumstances in this case, and based on my wider knowledge of how Coillte tends to process its requests for environmental information more generally. Asking for further clarification from Coillte would mean a further delay to the appellant, and I am satisfied that the outcome would be the same – the fee of 15EUR is reasonable and in line with article 15(1) of the AIE Regulations. Coillte should note for future that it is important that the details of how a timeframe for search, retrieval and collation of information for AIE requests is arrived at is detailed, accurate and specific to the circumstances of that case, especially in instances where it intends to charge a fee for such information.
37. As I have set out, Coillte has reduced the charge to 15EUR on the basis that one of the records identified as being relevant to the request is publically available. In circumstances where a record is publically available, I would expect a public authority to draw the appellant’s attention to this in the first instance, rather than proceeding to spend time retrieving and compiling this information – especially in circumstances where it intends to charge a fee. Coillte has accepted the record in question is publically available - and has offered to reduce the fee by 50% to 15EUR, which I think is reasonable in the circumstances.
38. Article 15(1) makes it clear that the question of what is a reasonable fee must be approached having regard to the requirements of the AIE Directive. Article 3(5) of the Directive requires Member States to ensure that“officials are required to support the public in seeking access to information” and that“the practical arrangements are defined for ensuring that the right of access to environmental information can be effectively exercised” . Article 7(1) seeks to ensure that public authorities are required“to organise the environmental information which is relevant to their functions and which is held by or for them, with a view to its active and systematic dissemination to the public, in particular by means of computer telecommunication and/or electronic technology, where available”. With this in mind, it is clear that AIE requests of a general nature often are of a kind that one would expect to either be proactively published by the public authority or organised and maintained by the public authority in a manner that enables its easy dissemination on request. In such circumstances I do not think it would be reasonable to allow a public authority to rely on its own failure to adequately organise its information to justify the imposition of a charge on the appellant in respect of work which arguably would not have been required had proper document management arrangements been in place.
39. I am not persuaded the particular information request at issue in this appeal falls into the category described above– two of the records consist of emails which in the normal course of events a public authority would not be expected to proactively publish. I say this bearing in mind that one of the email attachments (listed as Record 2 titled“PEFC and FSC Reports” on the Schedule of Records) which issued to the appellant with the internal review decision was, and is, publicly available. But overall I have considered the specific nature of the information sought, I am not persuaded that the remaining records are information that Coillte could be expected to proactively publish or hold in a way that enables easy dissemination. I also note that this Office has no jurisdiction to consider the general duties of a public authority in relation to environmental that arise under article 5 of the AIE Regulations, and I am restricted to considering this as an element of the reasonableness of the fee under article 15 of the AIE Regulations. Overall I am not persuaded that the charges proposed by Coillte are as a result of failure to comply with its duties under the AIE Directive. I have seen no evidence that this is the case.
40. Turning to the issue of the fee itself, Advocate General Fennelly’s Opinion in Commissioner v Germany made it clear that overall reasonableness of a fee must be judged from the perspective of members of the public, not of public authorities. Drawing on my experience from my various statutory remits, I consider that the average member of the public would not necessarily find 15EUR to be an unreasonable sum of money in the context of the other comparable expenses that members of the public incur on a daily basis. For example, an appeal to this Office in the absence of a medical card or other such mitigating factor incurs a charge of 50EUR.
41. While not appropriate to make a direct comparison, it is also worth considering that the fees in dispute in Case C-71/14,East Sussex County Council v Information Commissioner , for the supply of information relating to property charges (a total charge of approximately 23EUR) and in the analogous case of C-216/05, Commission v Ireland, concerning fees for participation in the environmental impact assessment procedure (20EUR in procedures before local authorities and 45EUR in procedures before An Bord Pleanála), were higher than the fee at issue in this appeal. I am mindful that the aforementioned cases were all unique in their circumstances, pertain to periods in the past and that account naturally should be taken of the fact that currency values can fluctuate over time due to a variety of factors.
42. The test set out byEast Sussex also explains that when assessing the reasonableness of the charge“account must be taken… of the public interest in the protection of the environment” . I have considered the public interest in the protection of the environment of the information within the record. In general, if there is a high public interest, this may call into doubt the reasonableness of the charge.
43. The appellant submits that there is a public interest in the work it carries out as an environmental NGO. It states it“is a voluntary community group with no fixed income. The group is entirely dependent on fund-raising and donations from supporters. We have to find thousands of euros a year to challenge forestry licence decisions of the Minister - 25 successful appeals in 2023 at 200 euros a time - we cannot afford to appeal all of the decisions that we would like to due to the financial burden.” While I accept that the work carried out by environmental NGOs in general does serve a public interest, the appellant has not persuasively set out how there is a significant public interest in the information at issuein this case . I do not find that the public interest in this specific case is high enough to render the fee of 15EUR charged by Coillte unreasonable.
44. Taking all of the above into account, in the circumstances of this case I am not persuaded that the fee imposed by Coillte is unreasonable either subjectively or objectively. In other words, it satisfies the test set out byEast Sussex to determine whether a charge imposed has a deterrent effect on persons wishing to obtain the information or that may restrict their right of access to information. It follows that I find that Coillte was justified in charging a fee of 15EUR in this case.
45. The appellant has questioned how much is paid by Coillte in terms of administration of the charge for and process small requests such as this – and asserts that the sole purpose of the application of the charge is to deter requesters. For the reasons I have set out in detail above, I do not consider the fee imposed by Coillte in this case to be unreasonable and do not consider it to be a deterrent. Beyond that, Coillte’s decision to charge a fee versus the administrative costs involved in calculating and creating an invoice is an internal matter for Coillte alone. My remit is to decide if the fee imposed under article 15(1) is justified, and in this case I have found that it is.
46. The appellant has also stated that“the findings and recommendations in the ACCC case ACCC/C/2017/147 (para. 89) would indicate that Coillte's fee is based on charging for work that they should not be charging for, i.e. indirect costs.”
47. By way of background, the ACCC was established under Article 15 of the Aarhus Convention and serves as a compliance mechanism whereby Parties to the Convention or members of the public may, for example, bring a concern regarding the implementation of the Convention to the Committee for consideration. It is a non-confrontational, non-judicial and consultative mechanism established to review compliance by Parties to the Convention. While it is useful to refer to, the question before me is whether the public authority in this appeal acted in accordance with article 5(2) of the Directive, and applied article 15(1) of the AIE Regulations correctly, and in deciding this I am bound by the relevant case law. I have set out above the ECJ inEast Sussex clearly stated that charging for time spent on indirect costs ie search and retrieval of records is permitted, therefore I find that Coillte was entitled to take this into account when calculating the charge.
48. The appellant makes the point that Coillte should not be able to charge for the time taken to issue a Schedule of Records to the appellant. While there is no obligation contained in the regulations to provide such a schedule, it is best practise to do so, and public authorities are encouraged to provide requestors with a schedule of records when processing AIE requests. Coillte has done so in this case. As this forms part of the “compilation of the records”, and public authorities are entitled to charge for indirect costs, I do not think the fact that Coillte have done so renders the fee of 15EUR in this case unreasonable.
50. For the reasons I have set out in detail above, I do not consider the fee of 15EUR imposed by Coillte in this case to be unreasonable and do not consider it to be a deterrent.
51. Having carried out a review under article 12(5) of the AIE Regulations, I affirm Coillte’s decision to charge a fee of 15EUR for the supply of information in line with article 15(1) of the AIE Regulations.
52. I note the appellant has already paid the fee of 30EUR to Coillte to receive the records at issue. Coillte should arrange a refund of 15EUR to the appellant if it has not already done so.
53. A party to the appeal or any other person affected by this decision may appeal to the High Court on a point of law from the decision. Such an appeal must be initiated not later than two months after notice of the decision was given to the person bringing the appeal.
Julie O’Leary on behalf of the
Commissioner for Environmental Information